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Abstract: Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) claim that evolution has influenced our 
moral faculties in such a way that, if moral realism is true, then we have no positive moral 
knowledge. I present several popular objections to the standard version of this argument, then 
give a new EDA that has clear advantages in responding to these objections. Whereas the 
Standard EDA argues that evolution has selected for many moral beliefs with certain contents, 
this New EDA claims that evolution has selected for one belief: belief in the claim that 
categorical reasons exist. If moral realism is true, then this claim is entailed by all positive moral 
claims, and belief in it is defeated due to evolutionary influence. This entails that if realism is 
true, then we have no positive moral knowledge. While there may be objections against this 
New EDA, it is much stronger than the Standard EDA, and one realists ought to worry about.  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 Recently, philosophers have been especially concerned with the role that evolution has 
played in shaping our moral faculties. None deny that evolution has had some influence. But some 
argue that, if moral realism were true, such evolutionary influence would undermine our moral 
knowledge. I, and others, find such “evolutionary debunking arguments” (EDAs) to be deeply 
flawed, as they are normally formulated. In this paper, I formulate a new EDA, which targets moral 
knowledge indirectly, by providing a defeater for belief in categorical reasons. But if realism is true, 
then all positive moral beliefs entail the existence of at least one categorical reason. I argue from this 
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that realism entails moral skepticism. One major virtue of this “New EDA” is that it  does a much 
better job at avoiding the deepest problems with standard EDAs. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows. In §1, I formulate what I call the Standard EDA. 
This argument is meant to put in its most plausible form what is common to all (or at least most) of 
the EDAs on the market today. In §2, I summarize four popular objections to the Standard EDA. 
In §3, I defend the New EDA. Finally, in §4, I revisit the objections to the Standard EDA, showing 
how  two of them don’t threaten the New EDA, while with regard to the other two, the New EDA 
has distinct advantages over the Standard EDA. I conclude that there is a strong case to be made 
that, if moral realism is true, then we rationally ought to be moral skeptics. This is, at the very least, a 
high price for realists to pay.  
1. The Standard EDA 
Moral realism, as I define it, is the thesis that (i) sincere moral judgments express beliefs, (ii) 
some of those beliefs are true, and (iii) the truth of moral beliefs does not constitutively depend on 
the attitude of any actual or hypothetical agent (Shafer-Landau 2012: 1). There have been many 
objections to moral realism on evolutionary grounds (Street 2006; Joyce 2007: ch. 6; Horn 
forthcoming; Greene 2008: 35-80; Kitcher 2007; Ruse and Wilson 1986: 173-192).1 Here I will focus 
on what I consider the most popular type of evolutionary objection—what I’ll call the Standard 
EDA: 
The Standard EDA 
1. Epistemological Premise: If (a) moral realism is true, (b) evolution has strongly 
influenced our moral faculties in ways that are doxastically discriminating, and (c) there is 
no independent confirmation of the reliability of those faculties, then we have no positive 
moral knowledge. 
2. Empirical Premise: Evolution has strongly influenced our moral faculties in ways that are 
doxastically discriminating. 
3. Autonomy: There is no independent confirmation of the reliability of our moral faculties. 
                                            
1 I make no claims to perfectly summarize any author’s views; I attempt here to construct the best possible objection 
that makes sense of what such authors say.  
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4. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge. 
 
I’ll explain (2) and (3) before explaining (1)—but first, a terminological point. “Positive moral 
knowledge” is knowledge of a positive moral claim. A positive moral claim is one that attributes a 
moral predicate to something. Examples include “Stealing is wrong” and “It would be generous to 
buy this man a meal.” Likewise, when I later talk of “positive moral beliefs,” I mean only “belief in a 
positive moral claim.” 
Regarding (2), a faculty is influenced by X in a “doxastically discriminating” way iff the 
faculty is, in virtue of X, disposed to produce beliefs with certain propositional contents rather than 
others. Consider the belief that incest is wrong. A human who believes that incest is wrong is more 
likely to have offspring who can pass on their genetic material than a human who doesn’t have this 
belief. This is because incest increases the chances of sterility or deformation in one’s offspring, and 
believing that incest is wrong will make one less likely to engage in it. So, evolution selects for the 
belief that incest is wrong (or something like it).2 
Premise (3) is an autonomy thesis about the moral: we cannot confirm the reliability of our 
moral faculties except by showing that they have generated (mostly) true moral beliefs. But this 
cannot be done without assuming either the reliability of our moral faculties or the truth of our 
moral beliefs. For example, there is no moral almanac by which we can check the moral facts. 
 Premise (1) is the most obscure, partly because, as Shafer-Landau (2012) points out, there 
are so many ways of understanding why the consequent might follow from (a-c). Here is one way it 
has been defended (Joyce 2007: ch. 6; Bedke 2009; Clarke-Doane 2012): 
 Insensitivity 
5. If (a-c) hold, then we would have the positive moral beliefs we do regardless of whether 
they are true.  
6. If we would believe that P regardless of whether P, then we do not know that P. 
                                            
2 Some might wonder at the idea that evolution could influence our mental faculties at all. But evolutionary psychologists 
propose that evolution could explain both physiological and psychological phenomena. For a fuller account of this 
proposal, see James (2011): 18-19. 
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7. Therefore, if (a-c) hold, then we have no positive moral knowledge. 
 
The plausibility of Insensitivity is not very important here: I give it just as an example of how (1) is 
defended. But briefly, (6) is supposed to be an intuitively plausible epistemological principle. (5) is 
claimed to hold because evolution selects for the content of our beliefs, not their truth. It is adaptive 
for you to believe that you ought to take care of your children regardless of whether it is true. 
However, let me emphasize that there are many ways of arguing for (1), and no part of my 
argument here depends on any one in particular. Furthermore, there may be reasons to doubt (5)—
for example, Fitzpatrick (2014) argues that (5) presupposes that evolution is the only influence on our 
moral judgments. But I offer Insensitivity simply to aid in understanding some of the typical 
rationales that underlie the Standard EDA.  
2. Objections to the Standard EDA 
The Standard EDA, however appealing, has its share of problems. In this section I will 
summarize four popular, quite strong objections to it. I do not claim that proponents of the 
Standard EDA have no reply to any of these objections. However, in §4, I’ll argue that the New 
EDA fares better with regard to all of them. 
2.1 The Limited Explanation Objection 
The first objection, one that has received wide support, I will call the limited explanation 
objection (Shafer Landau 2012: 5-8; Fitzpatrick 2014: 241-246; Parfit 2011: 534-538; Huemer 2008b: 
368-392; James 2011: 79-81; Copp 2008: 194; Street 2006: 155). It essentially consists of a denial of 
the empirical premise, (2). Proponents of the objection grant that there are some moral beliefs that 
have clear and plausible evolutionary explanations (like the belief that incest is wrong). But there are 
other moral beliefs that do not have such clear evolutionary explanations (e.g., the belief that all 
human persons have equal and inalienable rights).  
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With such undebunked beliefs in hand, the realist can take the limited explanation objection 
in two different directions. She can argue—as Michael Huemer (2008b), Joshua Greene (2008), and 
Peter Singer (2005) each do—that we should abandon our debunked beliefs while retaining our 
undebunked beliefs. Though (on a realistic picture) we might have to abandon many of our moral 
beliefs, we still have moral knowledge, and so the Standard EDA fails. We may even end up with a 
more coherent set of moral beliefs. 
On the other hand, it may be possible to gain back knowledge of our previously debunked 
beliefs from the undebunked ones. For example, there is a good evolutionary explanation of why we 
believe that we ought to take care of our children. But there isn’t as clear of an explanation of the 
belief that we ought to take care of any helpless person whose existence resulted partially from our 
voluntary action. And, in combination with some uncontroversial empirical premises—that my child 
is helpless, a person, and resulted partially from my voluntary action—this broader principle entails 
that I ought to take care of my children. So, I can know the latter, even though belief in it has an 
evolutionary explanation, because I can infer it from undebunked beliefs. (Maybe there are problems 
with the example; it is meant only as an illustration.) Whichever of these two strategies the realist 
takes, she can retain a substantial amount of positive moral knowledge. 
Now, the standard debunker does have some available replies. She might argue, e.g., that 
while the supposedly undebunked beliefs don’t admit of direct evolutionary explanations, they are 
indirectly explained by evolution (see James 2011: 2.4). But as mentioned earlier, I will not flesh out 
the dialectic any further. Hopefully, it is clear that the standard debunker has her work cut out for 
her, and it is unclear whether she will be able to answer the objection.  
2.2 The Independent Confirmation Objection 
Russ Shafer-Landau (2012: 33-35) targets premise (3) of the Standard EDA, claiming that 
there may be a source of independent confirmation of the reliability of our moral faculties. He 
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claims that we can show that a doxastic faculty is reliable by showing that it is either identical to or a 
species of a doxastic faculty that we have independent warrant for believing to be reliable. In the 
moral case, this would be independent confirmation in that it does not assume the reliability of our 
moral faculties, or the truth of any given moral belief. Furthermore, this confirmation is compatible 
with the autonomy of the moral domain—i.e., that no moral beliefs can be derived from non-moral 
ones.  
Shafer-Landau suggests that whatever faculties generate our non-moral synthetic a priori 
knowledge might also generate some set of our moral beliefs. And we have good reason to trust 
these faculties, which generate judgments such as that justified true belief is insufficient for 
knowledge, and that nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time. But plausibly, 
those very same faculties also generate our a priori moral beliefs, such as that it is pro tanto wrong to 
cause an innocent person to suffer. So we have good reason to trust (at least) the faculties that 
generate our a priori moral beliefs. And it stands to reason that, in the way mentioned in 2.1, from 
this base we could derive knowledge of many a posteriori moral claims. Again, I do not claim here that 
the standard debunker has no possible reply to this objection—he may, e.g., argue that the faculty 
that generates our a priori moral beliefs is not identical to/a species of any faculty that reliably 
generates non-moral synthetic a priori beliefs. But he has his work cut out for him here. 
2.3 The Overgeneralization Objection 
Some have argued that the Standard EDA—particularly the epistemological premise—is 
overbroad (Huemer 2008a: 218-219; Enoch 2011: 175-176; Shafer-Landau 2012: 22; Vavova 2014: 
82-83; Bedke 2009; Clarke-Doane 2012; see also Plantinga 1993: ch. 12). It seems to entail that if 
realism about a domain D is true, then strong evolutionary influence on D-faculties entails D-
skepticism. But our perceptual faculties have been strongly influenced by evolution, as have our 
mathematical faculties. So, if realism in these domains is true, then we have no perceptual or 
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mathematical knowledge. But if so, the objectors claim, there is certainly something wrong with the 
Standard EDA: certainly perceptual (if not mathematical) realism is true. Since we have perceptual 
(and mathematical) knowledge, we can justifiably dismiss the Standard EDA, since it implies that we 
do not. Once again, the standard debunker may have a plausible response. The standard debunker 
could, e.g., deny mathematical realism and argue that her reasoning does not extend to the 
perceptual domain since evolution selects for true perceptual beliefs (but for a problem with the 
latter, see Street (forthcoming b: 25-28). However—the old refrain—my point is simply that the 
path to a satisfactory response is not clear, and may be impassible.  
2.4 Third Factor Responses 
A fourth type of objection to the Standard EDA is what has been called a third factor 
response. Such responses target the epistemological premise, claiming that even if evolution has 
influenced our moral faculties and there is no independent confirmation of them, we could still be 
justified in our moral beliefs. Third factor responses generally start by assuming the truth of a 
substantive moral principle (though for a notable exception, see Behrends 2013).  They then show 
how, on this assumption, evolution predictably brings us to have (at least some) true moral beliefs, 
even though it doesn’t select for the truth of those beliefs. Many third factor responses have been 
proposed (Behrends 2013; Brosnan 2011; Enoch 2010 and 2011: ch. 7; Skarsaune 2011; Wielenberg 
2010 and 2014: ch. 4). It will suffice for my purposes to briefly outline two prominent ones—David 
Enoch’s and Erik Wielenberg’s. 
 Enoch asks us to assume (plausibly) that our survival—or whatever evolution “aims” at—is 
at least somewhat good. This makes it plausible that anything that promotes our survival (or 
whatever) is good. But now consider how evolution influences us to act in ways that promote our 
survival: often when Φing promotes survival, it is adaptive for us to believe that Φing is good—this 
makes us more likely to Φ. But now it’s much less of a surprise that many of our moral beliefs are 
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true: when Φing promotes survival, then (a) it is good (by our assumption) and (b) we are likely to 
believe that it is good. That our beliefs about goodness coincide with the facts about goodness is no 
longer a mystery. (As Enoch acknowledges, there may still be some explaining to do. This is 
unimportant here.)  
 Wielenberg attempts to defend (some of) our knowledge of rights. Assume, he says, the 
substantive moral principle that one has rights whenever one has certain mental capacities (call them 
“C”). The precise nature of C is unimportant, except for the following sufficient condition: 
whenever one has the capacity to form beliefs, one has C. Now imagine that I believe that I have 
rights. Because I have a belief, I have C. And because I have C, I have rights. So, on the assumption 
of one moral principle, we get the following result: whenever I believe I have rights, I actually do. 
Again, on one assumption, it’s no longer surprising that a large class of our moral beliefs are true. 
 That’s a very abbreviated introduction to the third factor response to the Standard EDA. 
There is much more to be said about each of the two exemplar views: for example, in each case, our 
knowledge of a limited class of moral claims might be expanded (via, e.g., coherence relations) to 
other moral claims. Furthermore, there may be ways that the standard debunker can reply to the 
likes of Enoch and Wielenberg (I discuss one such way in §4.3). But once again, it won’t be easy.  
This concludes my consideration of common objections to the Standard EDA. I do not 
claim that there are no other strong objections. These four, however, seem to me to be four of the 
strongest. And, as I’ll show in §4, the New EDA fares better in replying to each of them. 
3. The New EDA 
I think that there is a distinct EDA—the New EDA—that is plausible in its own right, in 
addition to its advantages vis-à-vis the above objections. In this section, I’ll outline the New EDA 
and defend its premises. Aside from the incorporation of a more complex epistemology in the New 
EDA, there is one basic difference between that argument and the Standard EDA. While the 
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Standard EDA debunks moral beliefs on the basis of their contents, the New EDA debunks moral 
beliefs on the basis of a claim that they all entail. The Standard EDA, for example, claims that 
evolution selects for the disposition to judge that it’s wrong not to take care of one’s children, and 
it’s on this basis that we have no knowledge of that claim. The New EDA, on the other hand, will 
claim that the judgment that it’s wrong not to take care of one’s children entails a claim belief in 
which is defeated. In fact, this claim, which turns out to be that categorical reasons exist, is entailed 
by all positive moral claims. From this, given some plausible epistemological principles, it follows 
that if moral realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge.  
 Before I turn to the New EDA, let me introduce and define an integral term: “categorical 
reason.” Defining this term is somewhat complicated by the fact that it is commonly defined in two 
different ways. According to the weaker definition: 
CR1:  A has a categorical reason to Φ in circumstances C iff A has a reason to Φ and any 
  agent in C has a reason to Φ. 
 
And according to the stronger definition: 
 CR2: A has a categorical reason to Φ in circumstances C iff A has a reason to Φ and that 
  reason obtains regardless of what desires (broadly construed) A has or what  
  judgments she makes. 
 
On this second reading, categorical reasons are just what many call “external reasons” (as in 
Williams 1981). I believe that the New EDA can be soundly formulated on either reading, though I 
have CR2 in mind in what follows.   
 Here is the New EDA: 
 The New EDA 
8. Assume that moral realism is true. 
9. Empirical Premise: Evolution has strongly influenced our belief in categorical reasons. 
10. Autonomy: There is no independent justification for belief in categorical reasons. 
11. If (9) and (10), then our belief in categorical reasons is defeated. 
12. So, our belief in categorical reasons is defeated. (9,10,11) 
13. All positive moral claims entail that at least one categorical reason exists, and we are 
justified in believing that this entailment holds. 
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14. If P entails Q, we are justified in believing that P entails Q, and our belief that Q is 
defeated, then we do not know that P. 
15. So, we do not have any positive moral knowledge. (12,13,14) 
16. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then we do not have any positive moral knowledge. 
(8,15) 
 
In the rest of this section, I will defend (9), (10), (11), (13), and (14). 
3.1 Defense of (9): The Empirical Business 
(9) is an empirical premise. Since I am just a humble philosopher, I cannot mount a full 
defense of this premise. What I can do, however, is show why there is at least enough support for 
(9) for us to worry about what would follow from it. This is, after all, all the standard debunker has 
(Street 2006: §3). 
 Let me start with a clarification. To say that evolution has strongly influenced our belief in 
categorical reasons does not mean that evolution has caused us to believe that categorical reasons 
exist. “Categorical reason,” after all, is a philosophical term of art. However, suppose that we had 
reason to think that evolution had favored humans who have a sense that there are some actions (or 
desires, etc.) that are favored no matter what. This would count as evidence of a strong evolutionary 
influence on our belief in categorical reasons, and thus would support (9). Henceforth, let “our 
belief in categorical reasons” be understood in this pre-theoretical way. 
 There is some reason to think such influence has occurred. The basic idea behind (9) is that 
those humans are more adaptive who believe that they have a reason to (e.g.) take care of their 
children no matter what they desire. Why is this? Because they will be more likely to take care of their 
children than if they merely desired to do so. As Richard Joyce points out, a mere desire to do 
something can easily be overridden by stronger desires, and long-term desires can be hastily re-
evaluated in light of short-term desires. Desires are, in Joyce’s (2001: 136-137) terms, “unreliable 
things” (see also Olson 2011). We will be far more adaptive if we believe that some things are 
favored/required no matter what we desire.  
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Further support for (9) is based on thinking about cooperative situations that can be 
modelled on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (James 2011: §2.6). These are cases in which multiple 
organisms would be better off (reproductively speaking) helping each other, but in which, if they 
deliberate from the standpoint of their self-interest, they rationally ought to play the free-rider. As 
James (2011: 59) notes, the problem in need of a solution, in such cases, is to “design individuals to 
establish and preserve cooperative alliances despite the temptation not to cooperate.” A community 
of individuals who have some mechanism that trumps their desires in favor of cooperative action will 
do better, reproductively speaking, than a community of individuals that does not. Such a 
mechanism is provided by a sense of having categorical reason to follow through on promises, to help 
those who help you, etc. With such a sense, even where you believe that it would be in your best 
interest to defect, you won’t. In sum, we seem to have enough reason to believe (9) that we should 
worry about what follows from it. 
3.2 Defense of (10): No Independent Justification 
So let’s assume that evolution has strongly influenced our belief in categorical reasons. Now  
I want to show that there is no independent justification for belief in categorical reasons. First off, 
what does it mean for a justification to be independent? A justification for belief in categorical 
reasons is independent iff it doesn’t rely on either (a) our intuitions about what categorical reasons 
we have, or on (b) our belief or intuition that P, where P would entail the existence of a categorical 
reason. 
 And, as it turns out, there is no such justification. For brevity’s sake, I’ll consider here just 
one well-known argument for categorical reasons. I footnote a second, for variety’s sake, at the end 
of the section. Consider David Enoch’s (2011: 261-262) “Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy” argument 
against existence-internalism—the thesis that one has a reason to Φ only if there is a sound 
deliberative route from one’s existing motivations to one’s Φing. Imagine that Sufficiently Bad Bad-
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Guy has no desire that would be promoted, even under ideal deliberative conditions, by refraining 
from harming Victim. Enoch argues: 
17. If existence-internalism is true, then Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy has no reason not to hurt 
Victim. 
18. But clearly Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy does have a reason not to hurt Victim.  
19. Therefore, existence-internalism is false. 
 
(17) follows from our supposition that Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy has no desire which would be 
served by refraining from hurting Victim, even under ideal deliberative conditions. But, so (18) 
claims, he does have a reason not to perform said heinous act. So, he must have a reason that obtains 
regardless of his desires, and that entails the existence of at least one categorical reason. 
 The problem, however, is apparent. The plausibility of (18) depends on our intuition that 
Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy has a categorical reason not to hurt Victim. The intuition that supports 
(18) is the same intuition that I would defend by saying “No, Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy has a reason 
not to hurt Victim, no matter what!” In fact, if I understand who Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy is, and I 
understand what a categorical reason is, then I can’t believe (18) without believing that his reason 
not to hurt Victim is a categorical one. So this argument for categorical reasons doesn’t give us 
independent justification for belief in them, whatever its other merits are as an argument.3 
Perhaps there are some arguments for the existence of categorical reasons that are entirely 
distinct from both that given in the text and in footnote 3, but I am unaware of them. Such 
arguments, I suspect, would not constitute independent justification of belief in categorical reasons; 
but then again, I would have to see the arguments first.  
 
                                            
3 Shafer-Landau (2009) gives an independent argument for categorical reasons:  the “fanatic” has no commitment 
promoted by not perpetrating an act of terror, and so has no non-categorical reason not to do so. However, since he is 
intuitively blameworthy, he must have a categorical reason to refrain. Yet, whereas Enoch’s argument violates (a) in the 
definition of independence, Shafer-Landau’s relies on an intuition that something obtains (the fanatic’s blameworthiness) 
that would entail the existence of a categorical reason, violating (b) in the definition of independence.  
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3.3 Defense of (11): Why Evolutionary Pressures Defeat Belief 
So now let’s assume that (9) and (10) are plausible. What follows from their conjunction? In  
(11) we get an answer analogous to (1), the epistemological premise of the Standard EDA: if (9) and 
(10)—and assuming moral realism—then our belief in categorical reasons is defeated. All I mean by 
such “defeat” is the classic notion from epistemology. A defeater D for A’s belief that P is a true 
proposition such that if A justifiably believed that D, then A would be unjustified in believing that P. 
When D obtains, we can say that A’s belief that P is defeated. One standard example is a Gettier 
case: you have a true, justified belief that it is 10:39, based on your view of a clock that reads 
“10:39.” But your belief may even now be defeated, since the clock you’re looking at is broken and 
you just happened to look at it when it read correctly. The proposition “The clock is broken” is a 
defeater for your belief that it is 10:39 because, if you justifiably believed that the clock was broken, 
you would not be justified in the belief that it is 10:39.  
I said above that there are many ways of arguing for the epistemological premise of the 
Standard EDA, giving Insensitivity as a notable example. The same is true regarding (11), I suspect. 
(Since the New EDA is, well, new, I cannot appeal to notable defenses of that premise.)  In this 
section I will offer just one defense of (11), based on an argument from insensitivity. Though I do in 
fact think that this argument is sound, there may well be other appealing defenses of the premise.  
 Here is the argument, which runs along the same lines as Insensitivity: 
 New Insensitivity 
20. If (9) evolution has strongly influenced our belief in categorical reasons and (10) there is no 
independent justification for belief in categorical reasons, then for any agent A, A would 
believe in categorical reasons regardless of whether they exist or not. 
21. If A would believe that P regardless of whether P, then A’s belief that P is defeated. 
22. Therefore, if (9) and (10), then for any agent A, then A’s belief in categorical reasons is 
defeated. 
 
The justification for (20) runs roughly as follows. Evolution selects for adaptive traits, and your 
belief that you have a categorical reason to (say) take care of your children would be adaptive 
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regardless of whether you actually do have such a reason. The belief that there are any categorical 
reasons at all is similarly adaptive (and thus selected for) because without it, you could not believe 
that you have any particular categorical reason. Now, a belief that P can be strongly influenced by 
such a truth-insensitive cause and yet still be sensitive to the truth—if the agent in question has 
some independent justification for the belief that P (e.g., God has told him that P), and his belief is 
also strongly influenced by this consideration. However, when there is a truth-insensitive cause of 
our belief that P—as evolution is, in this case—and there is no independent justification for 
believing that P, we would believe it regardless of whether P.4 
(21) seems to me an eminently plausible epistemological principle. When I would believe 
that P no matter whether P, this counts as a defeater for my belief that P. That is, if I would believe 
that P regardless of its truth, and if on top of that I justifiably believed this about myself, then I 
would not be justified in my belief that P. Suppose I believe that I’m a great basketball player. Then 
I find out (with justification) that, due to my immense self-confidence, I would believe this 
regardless of whether it was true or false. I would no longer be justified in my belief that I am a great 
basketball player. (Notice that I am not committed to the claim that, when A’s belief that P is 
insensitive, it is unjustified.) 
3.4 Defense of (13): Moral Claims Entail Categorical Reasons 
Call the thesis that all positive moral claims entail that some particular categorical reason exists 
“the entailment claim.” The entailment claim entails (13), since (i) if all positive moral claims entail 
the existence of some particular categorical reason, then they entail that at least one categorical 
reason exists, and (ii) an argument that all positive moral claims entail the existence of at least one 
categorical reason is also an argument that we are justified in believing this to be true. So I need to 
                                            
4 To avoid problems resulting from the metaphysical necessity of some moral claims, we should understand the 
counterfactuals here to quantify over all conceptually possible worlds, as in Clarke-Doane (2012): 320-321. 
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show here that, if moral realism is true, then the entailment claim is true. I’ll give two arguments to 
this effect. But first let me clarify the entailment claim. Consider the following four attenuations of 
it: 
 The entailment claim does not mean that each positive moral claim entails a categorical 
reason to do anything. I might have a categorical reason to feel a certain way, or to desire 
something in particular. E.g., that some act is generous may entail that I have a categorical 
reason to like when people perform that act. 
 The entailment claim does not mean that each attribution of a given moral property M 
entails a categorical reason to do (or feel, desire, etc.) the same thing in every situation.  That 
some act is M may give me a categorical reason to Φ in one situation and Ψ in another. E.g., 
that some act is generous may in one instance give me categorical reason to perform it; in 
another circumstance it may give me categorical reason to help someone perform it. 
 The entailment claim does not mean that each positive moral claim entails an all-things-
considered categorical reason. Positive moral claims often entail only pro tanto reasons. E.g., 
that some act is generous may give me pro tanto categorical reason to perform it, although I 
have trumping reasons to refrain.  
 The entailment claim does not mean that any agent with a positive moral belief also believes 
that some categorical reason exists. For all it says, even agents who are fully competent with 
moral concepts may be unaware of the entailment claim.  
So in sum, all positive moral claims entail a pro tanto categorical reason to Φ, where Φ is not 
necessarily an action and can vary across situations for a given moral claim. Finally, even where a 
positive moral claim is true, it is possible that not all agents who are competent with moral concepts 
will be aware of this entailment. Since each positive moral claim entails that some particular categorical 
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reason obtains, each also entails that at least one categorical reason obtains. So, if the entailment 
claim is true, then (13) is true. 
 There has been some dispute over the entailment claim—mostly within the debate over 
moral error theory. There are many who think that the entailment claim is true—that, in fact, it is a 
conceptual truth (Olson 2011; Joyce 2001: 175-177).5 Yet there are also some who deny it (Foot 
1972; Finlay 2008). Such denial is not worrisome for my argument here, because the arguments 
against the entailment claim rely on premises inimical to moral realism (as in Finlay 2008). My claim 
is that if moral realism is true, then the entailment claim is true (although not necessarily conceptually 
true).  
 I’ll give two arguments for the entailment claim. The first is the weakest, and it comes 
cheaply. Consider: what is it that makes moral claims moral, and not some other type of claim? It 
can’t be their normativity: prudential claims are normative, as are some epistemic claims. Nor can it 
be that they are other-directed: many claims about etiquette are other-directed. The entailment claim 
provides an answer: what makes moral claims moral is that they entail categorical reasons. I will 
leave this as a speculation (although see Joyce 2011, who agrees with me on this point)—whether 
the distinction between moral and non-moral claims is important, and whether there are other 
plausible ways to draw the distinction, are beyond my ken.  
 What I consider a second, stronger argument for the entailment claim relies directly on the 
commitments of moral realism. Without the entailment claim, we cannot explain the type of 
authority that moral claims have, according to realists. This is clearest in the types of cases that Enoch is 
considering. Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy has reason not to hurt Victim. But according to the moral 
realist, his reason not to hurt Victim is not conditional on his having an interest in Victim’s 
                                            
5 Outside of debates about error theory, I think Parfit (2011: 283-288) is committed to the entailment claim, and Enoch 
(2011: 94) expresses sympathy for it. 
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continued well-being, or on his desire not to see anyone suffer, or on any judgment that he makes. 
He shouldn’t do it no matter what! Even claims about what would be virtuous, or what states of affairs 
are good, have distinctive authority over us. Whatever the generosity of an action gives you reason 
to do/feel/think/etc., this reason is not contingent on your having any specific desires or 
judgments. This authority that moral claims have over us, according to realists, is explained only by 
their entailing categorical reasons (for similar points, see Parfit 2011: 283-288 and Joyce 2001: ch. 2). 
 Think of the matter a different way, via example. At the very least, if moral realism is true, 
then when some act is generous one has categorical reason to perform it in certain counterfactual 
situations. Surely if some act is generous, then ceteris paribus—i.e., where no energy is lost on your 
part by performing it that wouldn’t otherwise be lost, where you sacrifice nothing that you want by 
performing it, etc.—you have a categorical reason to perform it. In the specified situation, anyone, 
no matter what they desire or judge, has a reason to act generously. Similarly, assume that the absence of 
physical conflict is good. If we consider a situation where, by the press of a button, you can make it 
the case that physical conflict is avoided, and where it otherwise wouldn’t be, and where furthermore 
there are no competing goods that are sacrificed by one’s pushing the button—well, don’t we have 
reason, no matter what we desire, to push the button? If so, then if moral realism is true, even such 
positive moral claims as these entail the existence of a categorical reason. 
 Anti-realists are not similarly committed to the entailment claim—at least not all of them. 
Consider Streetian constructivism: the fact that A has a reason to Φ is constituted by the fact that 
the proposition “A has a reason to Φ” is entailed by A’s other judgments about reasons, the non-
normative facts, and the constitutive standards for judgments about reasons (Street 2009; Street 
2010; Street 2012; Street forthcoming). Street-type constructivism actually entails the falsity of the 
entailment claim, when that claim is read according to CR2. According to the Street-type 
constructivist, if moral claims entail reasons at all, they can’t be categorical reasons—all of A’s 
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reasons are constituted by facts about what normative judgments she makes, and so clearly do not 
obtain regardless of what judgments she makes. The upshot of all this is that moral realists are 
committed to the entailment claim, and thus (13), while at least some anti-realist views—I suspect 
most—are not.  
But perhaps, after all that I’ve said, there are still those who think that they can be moral 
realists without committing to the entailment claim. Yet even if so, the New EDA will simply apply 
to the type of realism committed to the entailment claim. And any type of realism that is not so 
committed will have a new problem: that of either explaining the authority of moral claims, or 
explaining away the appearance of such. 
3.5 Defense of (14): The Epistemological Business 
We can’t get the conclusion of the New EDA without some principle linking the defeat of 
belief in an entailed claim with lack of knowledge of the claim doing the entailing. In other words, 
we need (14): If P entails Q, we are justified in believing that P entails Q, and our belief that Q is 
defeated, then we do not know that P. However, that claim is not only plausible on its face, but it 
follows from two other epistemological premises, each even more plausible than (14).  
 Here’s the argument: 
23. If my belief that P is defeated, then I do not know that P.  
24. If P entails Q, we are justified in believing that P entails Q, and our belief that Q is 
defeated, then our belief that P is defeated.  
25. Therefore, if P entails Q, and our belief that Q is defeated, then we do not know that P. 
There are controversial claims that rely on (23)—e.g., attempts to provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for knowledge. But (23) merely asserts a necessary condition on knowledge, and that is 
not controversial at all (Klein 1971; Lehrer and Paxson 1969). It serves as a good explanation of 
why, in at least some Gettier cases, the agent does not have knowledge: there’s some true 
proposition that, if the agent justifiably believed it, would entail that her belief is unjustified.  
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 (24) is simply a closure principle for defeat, and it seems as plausible as any non-trivial 
epistemological principle. Here’s an example that may help to illustrate that plausibility. Suppose I 
look at the clock and, seeing that it reads “2:14,” conclude that it is afternoon. But the clock is 
broken, which defeats my belief that it is afternoon. I also believe that it is 2:14 p.m., which entails 
that it is afternoon. (24) says that, in this situation, my belief that it is 2:14 p.m. is also defeated.  
 I see no need to defend (24) further, since it is so plausible. But it just so happens that there 
is a valid argument for it, which only depends on a closure principle for justification: 
ClosureJ: If P entails Q, and I am justified in believing that P entails Q, then if my 
belief that Q is unjustified, then my belief that P is unjustified.  
 
I leave the defense of ClosureJ to others (Hawthorne 2004: ch. 1). Suffice it to say that it is as 
plausible a (non-trivial) principle as they come in epistemology. 
The argument for (24) is fairly complex. In what follows, recall that when A’s belief that P is 
defeated, there is some true proposition D such that, if A justifiably believed that D, then A would 
be unjustified in believing that P. The following argument actually shows something more specific 
than (24), but which entails (24)—that the same defeater that defeats belief that Q also defeats belief 
that P.  
26. P entails Q, I am justified in believing this, and my belief that Q is defeated.  
(Assumption) 
27. P entails Q.  
(&Elim 26) 
28. There is some true proposition D and if I justifiably believed that D, then I would not be 
justified in believing that Q. 
(from 26) 
29. There is some true proposition D.  
(&Elim 28) 
30. If I justifiably believed that D, then I would not be justified in believing that Q. 
(&Elim 28) 
31. I am justified in believing that D.  
(Assumption) 
32. I am not justified in believing that Q.  
(Elim 30, 31) 
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33. If P entails Q, I am justified I believing this, and I am not justified in believing that Q, then I 
am not justified in believing that P.  
(ClosureJ ) 
34.  I am justified in believing that P entails Q.  
(&Elim 26) 
35. P entails Q, I am justified in believing this, and I am not justified in believing that Q.  
(&Intro 27, 32, 34) 
36. I am not justified in believing that P.  
(Elim 33, 35) 
37. If I am justified in believing that D, then I am not justified in believing that P. 
 (Intro 31, 36) 
38. There is some true proposition D and if I am justified in believing that D, then I am not 
justified in believing that P (i.e., my belief that P is defeated).  
(&Intro 29, 37) 
39. Therefore, if P entails Q, I am justified in believing this, and my belief that Q is defeated, 
then my belief that P is defeated.  
(Intro 26, 38) 
 
The argument is sound so long as ClosureJ is true—as it almost surely is. 
In this section, I’ve defended the premises of the New EDA. I believe that defense has been 
successful, though merely suggestive at points (e.g., the empirical business). So at this point, it seems 
that realists ought to worry about whether the empirical premise is true. 
4. Revisiting the Objections to the Standard EDA 
In this section, I argue that on top of the New EDA’s independent plausibility, it has far 
better replies than the Standard EDA to the four objections above. I’ll argue that the New EDA has 
decisive replies to the first two objections, while it has distinct advantages over the Standard EDA 
with regard to the latter two.    
4.1 The New EDA’s Replies to the First Two Objections 
Recall the limited explanation objection: it hinged on the claim that there are some moral 
beliefs that do not easily admit of an evolutionary explanation. However, the New EDA can grant 
this. It’s empirical premise claims only the belief that categorical reasons exist has been strongly 
influenced by evolution. The Standard EDA’s empirical premise, on the other hand, claims that 
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many different (moral) beliefs have been so influenced. If evolution has strongly influenced our 
moral faculties in doxastically discriminating ways, then we should expect (at the very least) most of our 
moral beliefs to be adaptive. This makes it easy for the realist to find moral beliefs that are not likely 
to have emerged as a result of adaptive pressures, thus causing the standard debunker worry in 
proportion to the number of non-adaptive beliefs on display. The empirical premise of the New 
EDA is not open to such criticism. It relies only on the claim that one belief is adaptive, and it turns 
out to be clear how that belief would be adaptive. Let the contents of positive moral beliefs be what 
they may—e.g., what exactly we ought to do, or what acts are generous—the New EDA still entails 
that there is no moral knowledge. 
The independent confirmation objection, recall, was that we can independently confirm a 
doxastic faculty if we can show that it is identical to or a species of a type of faculty we know to be 
reliable, regardless of whether our moral faculties are reliable. It is clear why this objection does not 
apply to the New EDA: I am not targeting our moral faculties at all! Rather, I claim that a particular 
belief is defeated, since it was formed in a way that is not sensitive to the truth, and I derive the lack 
of positive moral knowledge from the defeat of this one belief. So Shafer-Landau’s objection just 
does not apply to the New EDA.  
One might think that my reply here is cheap, and that regardless of whether the objection 
applies to the New EDA, Shafer-Landau can show that our moral faculties are reliable. Doesn’t the 
reliability of our moral faculties outweigh (in some sense) the defeat of something entailed by our 
positive moral beliefs? If so, we could have positive moral knowledge even where our positive moral 
beliefs entailed a defeated belief. But this is no good. Even if we grant that our moral faculties are a 
species of some generally reliable faculty, this gives us merely pro tanto reason to trust them. If our 
moral beliefs are defeated—as I have argued they are—then we no longer have reason to trust them. 
As the plane crash survivor trudges through the desert, he may have pro tanto reason to trust his 
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beliefs about the convenience store he seems to see up ahead, since he knows that his faculty of 
vision is generally reliable. But that reason can be undermined if he learns that this particular belief is 
defeated—here the defeater is the claim that in circumstances such as those our survivor is in, we 
often seem to see things that aren’t there. In the same way, even if Shafer-Landau is right, his 
objection does nothing to threaten the New EDA. We could start with pro tanto reason to trust our 
moral faculties, but if I’m right, we still have no positive moral knowledge.  
4.2 The New EDA’s Reply to the Overgeneralization Objection 
The New EDA has an important advantage over the Standard EDA in replying to the 
overgeneralization objection. Recall the objection: if evolutionary pressures undermine moral 
knowledge on the assumption of moral realism, then they also undermine perceptual (or 
mathematical) knowledge on the assumption of perceptual (or mathematical) realism. It might seem 
that both EDAs are equally susceptible to the objection: after all, both claim that evolutionary 
influence of some kind undermines knowledge. And neither EDA has some special capacity to deny 
evolutionary influence on our perceptual or mathematical faculties or beliefs. So, perhaps both 
EDAs overgeneralize, if either does. 
However, I think that the New EDA has at least the following advantage in replying to the 
objection: whereas the Standard EDA targets our moral faculties in general, the New EDA targets a 
particular belief. But it seems that, if there has been evolutionary influence in the perceptual or 
mathematical realm, it has largely been influence on the respective faculties. No particular perceptual 
belief seems to have been selected for (e.g., that there is a table in front of me): such beliefs seem far 
too fine-grained to be the object of direct evolutionary influence. Similarly for mathematical beliefs: 
e.g., the belief that 679 – 456 = 223 is not directly selected for. And this means that the Standard 
EDA overgeneralizes to these realms, since it claims that evolutionary influence on a faculty means 
that the beliefs produced by that faculty don’t count as knowledge. The New EDA, on the other 
 
23 
 
hand, claims only that direct evolutionary influence on a belief means that that very belief does not 
count as knowledge. It can allow that indirect evolutionary influence on a belief (via influence on the 
faculty that produced that belief) doesn’t undermine knowledge.  
One might worry that the New EDA will still overgeneralize if perceptual or mathematical 
claims entailed the existence of a categorical reason. But such an entailment does not obtain. That 2 
+ 2 = 4 does not entail the existence of a categorical reason. Neither does the claim that there is a 
table in front of me. These are just not the kind of facts that entail any kind of reasons: whereas 
claims about reasons are normative, these are purely non-normative claims. And of course, it’s a 
commonplace in ethics (and normative theory in general) that a normative claim does not follow 
from a purely non-normative claim.  
For these reasons, I think that the New EDA has a better reply to the overgeneralization 
objection than does the Standard EDA. But unlike the New EDA’s responses to the first two 
objections, the response here does not seem utterly conclusive. So I claim only that the New EDA’s 
reply is superior to the Standard EDA’s, not that it is ultimately successful. 
4.3 The New EDA’s Reply to Third Factor Views 
Recall the general form of a third factor response: each generally starts by assuming a 
substantive moral principle. It then shows how evolution predictably brings us to have (at least 
some) true moral beliefs, even though it doesn’t select for the truth of those beliefs. I am not 
convinced that either EDA has a knock-down reply to this type of objection. However, it seems to 
me that the most promising reply available to either EDA works much better for the New EDA 
than for the Standard EDA, and in this respect the former is better off than the latter.  
If any EDA is to stand against third factor responses, it must be because those responses beg 
the question against the relevant EDA. Several philosophers have argued that this is indeed the case, 
with regard to the Standard EDA (Shafer-Landau 2012: 33-34; Behrends 2013: 7-8; Horn 
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forthcoming; Vavova 2014: 81; Vavova 2015: 111-112). It’s easiest to see why when we look at 
Enoch’s view, which assumes that survival is good. Belief in this claim has a clear evolutionary 
explanation (this is, in fact, integral to the success of Enoch’s reply). This belief is thus part of the 
target of the Standard EDA: it is such claims that the argument attempts to show that we can’t 
know, if realism is true. But surely we shouldn’t crucially rely on our belief that P, when replying to 
an argument that purports to show that we don’t know that P! So, Enoch shouldn’t rely on the claim 
that survival is good, since the Standard EDA attempts to show that he doesn’t know this.  
Consider the following analogy: you know that taking a certain pill will cause you to believe 
that Napoleon won the Battle of Waterloo (Joyce 2007: 179-180). You know that you have taken 
such a pill. Are you rationally permitted to rely on your belief that Napoleon won Waterloo in 
assessing whether you know that Napoleon won Waterloo? Of course not—to do so would assume 
the very knowledge in question. For the same reason, we cannot assume the truth of any positive 
moral claim when assessing whether we have any positive moral knowledge.  
My goal here is not to prove that this strategy for replying to third factor views is ultimately 
viable. That would require fuller argument. But I do hope it’s clear that this is the best option for the 
standard debunker to take in replying to third factor views. The jig is up, so to speak, if the standard 
debunker allows her critic to appeal to some positive moral claims in his response (although for an 
independent line of objection, see Joyce 2016). 
However, when applying this argumentative strategy, the standard debunker will run into a 
problem that the new debunker won’t. To see why, let’s look to Wielenberg’s third factor response. 
His substantive moral principle is that any person with C has rights. But notice: this is precisely the 
sort of claim that seems incapable of direct evolutionary explanation, since it’s unclear why it would 
be adaptive to believe it. In fact, it might be downright disadvantageous: if I have the belief in 
question, in many circumstances I will put my kin on equal standing with those who are completely 
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unrelated to me, lowering the chances of passing on my genes. In this way, the standard debunker’s 
appeal to the question-begging strategy depends crucially on her ability to reply to the limited 
explanation objection. 
To state the point modestly: it is unclear whether evolution has had a strong influence on 
our belief that all beings with C have rights. And it seems to me that, in such a situation, it is 
permissible to rely on this belief in replying to the Standard EDA. Return to our analogy: 
Wielenberg’s case is like not having good reason to believe that you have taken the Napoleon Pill. In 
such a situation, it is plausible that you can rationally rely on your belief that Napoleon won 
Waterloo. So, the Standard EDA is susceptible to at least one third factor response even if we grant that 
others (like Enoch’s) are question-begging.  
However, we have seen that the New EDA targets all moral beliefs and is therefore immune 
to the limited explanation objection. For this reason, both third factor responses under 
consideration will beg the question against it, if either does. So will most third factor views, since 
most assume a positive moral claim. But the New EDA has it that all moral claims entail a 
categorical reason, which (long story short) means that we can’t have knowledge of any positive 
moral claim. So, all third factor views that assume a substantive normative claim—including both 
Wielenberg’s and Enoch’s—will beg the question against the New EDA by assuming what it 
purports to disprove: that we have any positive moral knowledge. So in sum, the Standard EDA has 
a vulnerability to third factor views that the New EDA does not. It is a derivative vulnerability—
deriving from the Standard EDA’s vulnerability to the limited explanation objection—but a 
vulnerability nonetheless.  
The New EDA’s reply here is not decisive. It depends on whether the question-begging 
reply works in general; it is also vulnerable to any third factor response which can manage not to 
assume a positive moral claim, such as Behrends (2013). But the New EDA has a very important 
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advantage over the Standard EDA in replying to third factor views, just as it does in replying to all 
of the objections mentioned here. 
Conclusion 
 The fact that evolution has strongly influenced our moral beliefs seems worrying, at first 
glance, if the moral facts don’t depend constitutively on our attitudes. However, there are some deep 
problems that face the standard formulation of the argument. The New EDA, which I have 
presented here, gives an independently plausible line of argument that avoids many of the problems 
with the Standard EDA. If that argument works, then moral realism entails moral skepticism—an 
intolerably high price for realists to pay. I cannot say here conclusively whether the argument 
succeeds—the state of empirical work is incomplete, and there are further questions to be answered 
regarding the overgeneralization and third factor objections. What I can say, however, is that this is a 
seriously worrisome argument for realists—far more worrisome than the Standard EDA.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
6 For helpful feedback, I would like to thank Sinan Dogramaci, Casey Hart, Alex Hyun, Eric Sampson, Mark Schroeder, 
Russ Shafer-Landau, Sharon Street, two anonymous referees, and all the participants of the 2015 Texas Tech Graduate 
Conference on metaethics. 
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